Community Toilet Complex: Bihar Village
Your village needs a modern sanitation facility serving 50 households. The toilet complex costs ₹8 lakh to build and maintain. Each household benefits from improved health and dignity, but the facility is non-excludable - everyone benefits regardless of contribution.
Economics: Individual benefit ₹5,000/year, Construction cost ₹8,00,000, Optimal contribution per household: ₹16,000
₹0
Current Funding
₹8,00,000
Required Funding
🏠 Your Household Contribution
₹0 (Free Rider)
₹16,000 (Fair Share)
₹50,000 (Altruist)
Make your contribution decision to see the collective action outcome and analyze free-rider incentives...
📊 Public Goods Analytics
0
Rounds Played
0%
Success Rate
0%
Avg Efficiency
0%
Free Rider Rate
🏃♂️ Free Rider Analysis
Analyzing contribution patterns...
📈 Provision Efficiency
Public good underprovided
🔬 Public Choice Theory
Samuelson Condition
Optimal public good provision: Sum of marginal benefits equals marginal cost (∑MBᵢ = MC).
Free Rider Problem
Non-excludability creates incentives to under-contribute, leading to systematic underprovision of public goods.
Nash Equilibrium
Rational agents contribute less than socially optimal, creating prisoner's dilemma in public goods provision.
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
Voluntary contributions typically provide only 40-60% of optimal public good levels in experimental settings.
Olson's Logic
Large groups face greater collective action problems than small groups due to diffused responsibility and lower pivotality.